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RECENT BOOKS
.ARMS CoN'IROL AND INSPECTION IN AMERICAN LAW. By Louis Henkin.
With a Foreword by Philip C. Jessup. New York: Columbia University
Press. 1958. Pp. x, 289. Index. $5.50.
The character of war has changed qualitatively with the development
of new "absolute" weapons against which there is no effective defense. Arms
regulation under international control has become a central problem of
American foreign policy and in the Geneva negotiations for the cessation
of nuclear weapons tests, the great powers came to grips with real issues
and concrete solutions for the first time in the long history of disarmament
discussions.
The recently-published Feld Report, prepared by a group of American
scientists, emphasizes the necessity for obtaining more knowledge than is
now available on the technical problems of disarmament, on topics ranging
from the detection of nuclear explosions and radioactivity to the surveillance of weapons production facilities. The Report concludes that such
technical research is essential for making sound policy decisions before and
during disarmament negotiations and also may encourage governments to
seek appropriate types of arms limitation agreements, some of which may
previously have not been considered feasible or desirable.1
The need for more knowledge is not limited to the technical aspects of
arms control. As Judge Philip C. Jessup points out in his forceful introduction to Professor Henkin's volume, "Arms Control and Inspection in
American Law," no one seems to have heretofore studied the problem from
the point of view of the legal and administrative issues involved in enforcing an inspection system in the United States. This may be due, he suggests, to the fact that the entire subject has appeared to the public as "remote governmental business," removed from the individual and from the
community. Yet every citizen would be deeply concerned if, for instance,
the United States should accept an agreement giving an international inspection team the right to enter a plant which he owns or where he works
or even the home where he lives. While legal and constitutional considerations of course will not determine the basic arms control policy, they will
have to be taken into account at least in ensuring that any control agreement which the United States would want to urge upon others can be
made effective by and in the United States.
In order to reach the constitutional and legal issues, Professor Henkin
was required to project his thinking and speculate on three different levels.
That he succeeded in his undertaking is telling evidence of his imaginative
prowess.
The first and "highest" level of his speculation called for developing certain minimum assumptions of what American arms control policy will be
1 FELD, BRENNAN, FRISCH, QUINN 8: ROCHLIN, THE TECHNICAL PROBLEMS OF
CONTROL-A REPORT TO THE INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ORDER l (1960).
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in the years ahead. Professor Henkin calls his book "a memorandum of
law," and his policy projection is limited to providing background and
foundation for the legal study. Consequently only the first chapter, containing sixteen pages, is devoted to this topic, and future American policy
is sketched in a very general outline based on past proposals: while retaining full military strength and capacity for reprisal, the United States will
be prepared initially to enter into agreement on small steps including
limitations on the number of men under arms, a moratorium on the testing
of new weapons and on the production of nuclear materials for additional
weapons, subject of course to inspection, including aerial inspection. In
discussing the future place of disarmament in American foreign policy,
Professor Henkin states that "The United States earnestly seeks disarmament"; (p. 9) yet two pages later he reports that "Even in the consternation
caused by the missile race, leaders in Congress and in government, with few
exceptions, appear to exclude arms control from serious consideration in
the development of national policy." (p. 11) This apparent contradiction
illustrates the distressing dilemma of responsible men in the United States
who accept the need for arms regulation but justly suspect that the primary
if not the only objective of the Soviet Union in past disarmament negotiations was unilateral disarmament of the West.
The second level of Professor Henkin's speculation concerns the content
of the control and inspection provisions in an imaginary future agreement
on arms regulation. The provisions which he postulates in the second
chapter, a brief eight pages, are not found in any one proposal hitherto
made but are instead a distillation of various suggestions and estimates of
what may be required. Here the author relies in part on the results of a
parallel technical inquiry by Columbia University Institute of War and Peace
Studies.2 The assumption is that an international agreement in the form
of a treaty would be ratified by the United States with the necessary implementing legislation adopted by the Congress. The treaty would provide
for control of possession and manufacture of certain arms, munitions and
materials, and of the conduct of certain activities by anyone in the United
States, the type and disposition of armed forces, verification, reporting and
inspection by international inspectors employing any known method including aerial observation, acoustic and seismic devices, physical entry, etc.
Professor Henkin refers in a footnote to the Statute of the International
Atomic Energy Agency, which contains a framework of safeguards and inspection relating to nuclear material. The area of speculation might have
been reduced somewhat if more detailed consideration had been given by
the author to these provisions which were accepted by some seventy states,
including the Soviet Union and the United States.
The third and "lowest" level of Professor Henkin's projection deals with
the impact on American law of the control and inspection provisions of
2 !NSPECilON FOR DISARMAMENT

(Melman ed. 1958).
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his postulated agreement. This part forms the bulk of the volume. The
fundamental question - can the United States under its Constitution agree
to control arms, and if so, subject to what limitations? - leads to an expert
examination of the limits upon the treaty power as defined through history
from Geofroy v. Riggs, Missouri v. Holland to Reid v. Covert. Perhaps
the most interesting part of the analysis is buried in footnotes which, alas,
are inconveniently placed at the back of the volume in a misguided effort to
make the book more palatable to the "layman." Having considered Articles
II and VI of the Constitution and the possible objection that a treaty
limiting U.S. armed forces impairs the President's power as "Commanderin-Chief," or the congressional power to maintain "armies" and "a navy,"
or to declare war, Professor Henkin rejects any doubt as to the power of the
United States under the Constitution to enter into an arms control agreement. In the absence of some form of supra-national government, however,
any such agreement would not be "irrevocable" in the sense of depriving
Congress of the power to enact conflicting legislation. "Although there
has not been adjudication in the courts of the validity of any disarmament
agreement of the United States, this nation has made agreements in the
past to limit the size of its navy and to disarm all vessels on the Great Lakes;
it has also agreed in the United Nations Charter that the appropriate
organ of the United Nations shall consider and recommend to members
proposals for disarmament; and it has negotiated on disarmament on numerous occasions with a view to concluding a treaty." (pp. 28-29) In a
similar vein, Professor Henkin investigates the constitutional provisions
relating to the rights of states ("the reserved powers" and the state militia
provisions) and the rights of persons (the right to bear arms under the
second amendment, the protection of liberty and property under the fifth
amendment, the patent rights and the due process protection of academic
and intellectual freedom) to conclude that these provisions likewise would
not bar an arms control treaty.
In Chapter IV, the author examines the extent to which measures which
would be required to investigate and enforce compliance with arms control
would conform to the fourth, fifth, sixth and fourteenth amendments.
His analysis includes both indirect methods (such as reports by governments, aerial inspection and wire-tapping) and direct interrogation by an
international inspectorate of U.S. officials and private citizens, as well as
inspection of private enterprises and dwellings. To be lawful, an inspection
of a dwelling without a court warrant might require a constitutional
amendment, he concludes.
Chapter V deals with the type of congressional legislation which would
be necessary to implement arms control, particularly the regulatory legislation and immunity statutes to offset the privilege against self-incrimination
and to define privileges and immunities of the inspectors.
In Chapter VI, pointing to the unhappy experience with Prohibition
and some other attempts at federal regulation, Professor Henkin stresses
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the need for popular acceptance of any controls and for support from state
and local authorities: "Some eccentric elements in a control scheme . . .
might even require formal state consent by legislation or constitutional
amendment. In other respects, state action ... might be important or helpful." Only a brief seven pages are devoted to this important aspect; but in
this and in other instances where one might wish for a fuller exploration
of the questions raised, the author's restraint is understandable considering
the limited objective which he had set for himself.
The concluding Chapters VII and VIII consider the constitutional
problems which would arise if important powers of regulation, administration and adjudication should be delegated to an international control body
with authority over American citizens.
The author's conclusions confirm his mature political judgment, his
sense of reality and proper appraisal of the role of law in policy making.
In general, he points out, legal as well as domestic political problems would
be avoided if the United States Government were made responsible to an
international control body, and if the national government rather than
the international body were given the task to regulate the activities of its
citizens to assure the nation's compliance with the treaty. This would
avoid "the new and difficult issues" involved in a system of international
administrative process applied directly to the citizens. Professor Henkin
makes a convincing case that the probable characteristics of an arms control plan, including essentials of direct inspection, would lie largely within
the United States Constitution. It is the "eccentric, perhaps the extreme
suggestion" which is not necessary to effective enforcement - the incursion
into the home - which would raise major constitutional questions. As for
the implementing legislation, the Congress would be required to establish
a system of regulation not unlike that which applies to existing regulated
industries. The Atomic Energy Act, to mention one example, would require extensive revision, and legislation would be necessary to protect the
citizen and industry from damage or loss due to abuse of the inspection
process. But for most of the legislation envisaged, there is precedent in
existing laws, and, in its impact on the citizen, arms control "should not
prove more onerous, more jarring to traditional behavior and liberties than
control of narcotics, or liquor, or firearms, or filled milk.'' (p. 154) Few
Americans would probably hear of the "foreign" inspectors and fewer still
would have contact with them.
These concluding thoughts confirm what hardly needs any confirmation:
the important obstacles to arms control have not been in law but in "the
foreign policies of nations," first and foremost of the Soviet Union. Yet
Professor Henkin warns that were the Soviet Union to make important
concessions toward reasonable agreement, there might still be opposition
in the United States to substantial reduction and control of arms because
of the fear and distrust of the Soviet Union. In the opinion of this reviewer,
the understandable fear of impairing the essential military strength of the
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United States has made it impossible thus far for the United States Government to develop technically sound, comprehensive and detailed proposals which would provide for realistic inspection safeguards commensurate with each progressive step of the plan and which could be offered as a
basis for realistic negotiations. If there should be any indication of a substantial modification of the Soviet attitude, it will be necessary, Professor
Henkin suggests, "to educate ourselves in new habits of thought. . . . The
purpose of a defense policy," he states, "is to forestall and, if possible,
remove danger. The United States may do that more effectively by disarming its enemies than by frantically building up its armaments of uncertain comparative effectiveness... .'' (p. 156)
The nineteenth-century American lawyer did not feel compelled to
think ahead when the steam-engine was about to change the face of the
Continent and affect profoundly the lives of its people; he was satisfied to
confront the new problems as they emerged in litigations before the courts
or as they demanded urgent remedial legislation. In our century, the high
stakes in preserving peace and the social values involved do not allow the
leisurely empirical and pragmatic approach of the last century. Today,
when an important advance in technology presents new social problems, a
modem lawyer who has acquired some understanding of the technical,
political and economic implications can make an important contribution
in the policy-making process by anticipating institutional and administrative questions and suggesting alternative solutions. This applies to advances in the field of atomic energy, use of the outer space, and automation
- to mention only a few. Professor Henkin has shown in his stimulating
volume, written in an urbane and lively prose, that the proposition applies
also in the field of arms control. Today, his book should prove interesting
to planners; and if any progress is made toward an agreement on arms
control, it will become invaluable to negotiators and lawmakers.

Eric Stein,
Professor of Law,
University of Michigan

